教学项目
Teaching Project
管理学院暑期学校暨第十七届雏鹰大讲堂第6讲(总第253讲):西北大学马晨教授
应体育在线365手机版王雷副教授邀请,西北大学马晨教授将于我院进行学术讲座,欢迎感兴趣的师生参加!
题 目:Determinants and Consequences of Lenient Audit Opinions时 间:2023年7月12日上午9:00-11:00
地 点:腾讯会议(298 998 805)
主讲人:马 晨 教 授
主持人:王 雷 副教授
主讲人简介:
马晨,管理学博士(会计学专业)、西北大学教授,博士生导师,陕西省审计学会常务理事、西安市会计学会常务理事、美国会计学会会员。近年来一直从事审计、会计差错、公司治理等相关内容的研究工作,在Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, European Accounting Review, Journal of Business Ethics以及《会计研究》《南开管理评论》等刊物上发表了40余篇,出版专著4部,主持国家自科、教育部项目等课题多项。
内容简介:
We examine why some audit partners issue lenient opinions and the related consequences. We find that lenient auditors usually have some audit-related competency. Specifically, we find that a lenient auditor is less likely to graduate from a top university, less likely to be elder, instead, she has more experience in auditing, provides low quality audits to clients but has higher revenue-generating ability, and that she is more likely to be an industry specialist. Opinion lenience has market share and career consequences. Opinion lenience is positively associated with subsequent client growth and audit fee growth. These effect is driven by new clients and fee increases from new clients, rather than keeping existing, non-manipulative clients. The associations are much more pronounced for settings in which auditors face intense competition, for engagement auditors instead of review auditors, for auditors with more financially healthy clients and more clients experiencing small profit following 2 consecutive years of loss. We also find that lenient auditors do not get sanctioned, because they are not likely to have regulatory talk with the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accounts (CICPA), and are not likely to be sanctioned by regulators, but clients receiving a lenient opinion in year t are more likely to restate subsequently. Finally, we also find some career consequences related to lenient auditors. They have higher likelihood of being assigned smaller, complex and risky clients, are more likely to move to big offices and less likely to lose the privilege of signing public clients.